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The small-scale industries programme of an Indian state was chosen
as a research topic because it is a prime example of the many kinds
of public projects in poor societies which are justified simultaneously
on "welfare" and on "efficiency" grounds. The aim was to discover
how decisions about, and within, the programme have been taken,
and how the cumulative pattern of these decisions has affected the
outcomes of the programme, in both social and economic terms. The
project thus related to both the Institute's general interest in income
distribution, and PGPAG's specific interest in access to
publicly-administered distribution processes. The aim was not to
make a naive point about any gap which might exist between the
ideology surrounding a programme and its actual outcomes, but to
discover more about the criteria which politicians and administrators
choose to use, or find themselves using, in distributing development
resources, and what implications this has for potential recipient
groups. It might, however, shed more light on whether the process of
ideological justification can remain quite unaffected by, or is forced
to take note of, what is actually being produced by a programme as
time progresses, and plan period succeeds plan period.
The Kerala Small-scale Industries Programme
The social and equity justifications for the small-scale industries
programmes of the Indian states have been several. First, they are
supposed to introduce members of under-privileged groups (the
unemployed, small agriculturists, even landless labourers) to a
reasonable livelihood which would otherwise be unobtainable, and to
support existing small manufacturers as against large firms. Secondly,
it has been assumed that small industries programmes will help to
decentralise industry, so that entrepreneurship, employment and
secondary effects are created in hitherto backward areas, thus
generating regional and geographical equality.
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But the programme is also represented as the most efficient way of
investing public resources, on the assumption that the end is a
transition from an economy almost entirely dependent on agriculture
and cash crops to one which has a solid and expanding industrial
base. Small-scale industry is defined for these purposes as modern
mechanised manufacturing where the fixed capital investment is less
than Rs. 750,000, the assumption being that traditional industry
with a low level of mechanisation, such as coir weaving, cashew nut
processing and handlooming, is now saturated and stagnant. The
efficiency argument rests on the fact that in the first place, the scale
of public state funds just is not sufficient to allow for the setting up
of more than one or two large-scale plants a year, so that the
large-scale sector is virtually left to the central government.
Secondly, it is argued that small-scale units get round the problem of
scarce managerial talent, and that they are also a way of mobilising
small and dispersed private savings which would otherwise remain
uninvested.
There was therefore always an inherent tension in the ethos
surrounding these programmes; if this activity was so objectively
worthwhile, how important was it for the authorities to induce the
right (i.e. socially right, and most deserving) individuals to be the
agents of its emergence and what was to be done if either such
individuals were not forthcoming or if they turned out to be inept in
some way, even if they did respond to the opportunities presented.
In terms of concrete measures, the Kerala small industries
programme has consisted of two main kinds of activities by the
government: first, the building of industrial estates consisting of
sheds ready to house new small industries, together with the required
infrastructure such as water supplies, power, machine shops and
roads, and secondly, the handing out of a range of subsidies in cash
and kind to certain small industries, both in states and outside in
their "natural" locale. These include grants and loans for capital and
working capital, the supply of quotas of cheap scarce raw materials,
granting of import licences, and provision of technical advice.
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Research Findings: 1
History of the programme
The research fell into two halves, each involving rather different
kinds of operations. The first task was to find out how decisions
about the operation of the programme had been taken and whether,
over time, there had been a process of feed-back from one set of
decisions to the next set; whether, in other words, decision-makers
took note of the outcomes of earlier decisions. The connected
question arose of whether such decision-makers actually sought out
information about outcomes, or whether this filtered back to them
randomly, and how results of various kinds were assigned priority.
This could only be tackled by talking to the politicians and
administrators at many levels who had been involved in such
decisions, and by examining contemporary accounts and reports.
The history of the programme's operation can be followed through
the outcomes of two kinds of decisions: first, the lumpy, aggregate
or policy decisions, and secondly, the routine, dispersed decisions.
Typically, the first kind is taken fairly high up the administrative
hierarchy, at widely-spaced time intervals, and involves large parcels
of investment resources. The second kind is taken by low level
officials from day to day and each involves a relatively small amount
of resources. Because the first kind of decision is much more visible
and because it involves large resources, the size of which are often
publicly known, such decisions are likely to command much more
public attention and evaluatory energy then the second kind.
Furthermore, because they are physically and chronologically
concentrated, their outcome is often much more apparent and easily
monitored than that of routine decisions, which are miniscule and
dispersed so that it is a far more difficult process to gather and
collate information about them. But this distribution of attention
and evaluation may be in inverse relation to the actual importance of
these relative outcomes. At least the overall outcome of routine
decisions is often as important as those of policy ones. The initial
attitude seems to have been that small entrepreneurs were potentially
universally and randomly distributed. All that was required for them
to spring into existence was the provision by the administration of
certain kinds of basic resources and services; a kind of catalyst or
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mid-wife role. But, gradually, administrators have discovered that
entrepreneurship is not recruitment-neutral; some sources, whether
social categories or geographical areas, are more productive than
others, so that an administrative response has occurred which has fed
back onto the access structures themselves. This has been reinforced
by the much less intentional or conscious outcomes of routine
decisions which have tended to favour certain categories of clients.
From one point of view, this is rational learning behaviour;
administrators are quite right to conclude that, given the whole
environment and the nature of the resources offered, what they
regard as small entrepreneurs are more likely to emerge from some
backgrounds than others. It has proved much more difficult to
induce the desired response from certain categories of potential
client. As far as recruiting entrepreneurs is concerned, this has meant
the poor, the uneducated and the low caste, and doubly so when
these attributes were combined with a rural base. As far as the
existing entrepreneurs are concerned, the losers in the distribution
process have been almost invariably the smaller and less sophisticated
units, and particularly those of a craft or artisan nature, rather than
those which started under conditions of routinised, standardised
production on the small factory model.
This is an entirely unsurprising outcome, and consistent with results
from many other programmes of a comparable nature, such as
agricultural extension and community development. The major
reason is that inequalities in the possession of other non-controlled
resources, ranging through wealth and education, information,
contacts and the most intangible assets of confidence and
motivation, are almost bound to intrude on the
administratively-controlled distribution process, either enabling the
advantaged to compete better, or else to make better use of the
handouts they receive. The possibility of insulating public
distribution systems against this kind of intrusion is extremely
problematic, and a crucial dilemma.
Looking specifically at the history of decisions about the estates
programme, two features emerge. First, there are certain premises
which are never questioned, such as the wisdom of concentrating on
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modern small industry as such. Within these rigidities, however, there
has been the process of administrative learning over time referred to
above. But the "adequate reponse" to investment which has been
sought has been defined very simply as the ability of units to survive.
This has meant that in the programme's own terms the welfare aspect
has lost out, as investment has become more spatially concentrated,
but also that the kinds of basic efficiency criteria originally appealed
to, such as that small industry would be less capital intensive than
large-scale industry, have not been translated into operational terms
either. What has happened is the concentrating of resources on
particular kinds of beneficiary, a process which is only partly
explained by debating the issue in terms of economic space.
Phase 1: the search for criteria
The first round of estates was set up in the mid 1950s, at the end of
the First Plan and during the Second. The idea of estates issued
directly from the central planning commission, but without any
clear specification of what they should be like. With no precedent for
this kind of investment, there was a good deal of confusion at the
state level about what should be done. The new resources could not
be pushed into existing channels.
As administrators now remember this phase, it seems to have been
one in which various ideas were hawked around until a set of
decisions "emerged". It was first suggested that there should be only
one large estate, and the site suggested was a small village in central
Kerala, called Kollakadavu, the main reason for this being that it was
the home of a national figure, P.C. Alexander, then All-India
Development Commissioner for Small-scale Industries. He took a
personal interest as a Keralite, and was not acting in an official
capacity as a central adviser. Thereafter, one or two other places
were suggested for similar reasons. Finally, the formula emerged,
no-one can remember from where, that there should be one estate
for each administrative district. It was probably that this was just the
simplest egalitarian-seeming solution to local demands. Without any
criteria being specified, and without local consultation, the sites
selected turned out to be on the edge of medium-sized towns in each
district, many being the district headquarters. The two exceptions
were one smaller town but this was itself only ten miles from a town
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of 55,000 population, and the village of Kollakadavu which was
retained. There was no attempt at any kind of feasibility study and
no prior canvassing of potential entrepreneurs. The process of
planning was remarkably ritual-free at this stage.
During the next few years, the problems were conceived to be only
those of getting the estates to materialise physically. Much energy
went into designing sheds and pieces of infrastructure such as water
tanks. The complaints from within the department were the endemic
ones about "co-ordination": the public works department was
accused of delaying the construction work, the electricity board of
being dilatory in providing electrical equipment. But there were no
qualms about the potential supply of entrepreneurs. The general
assumption seems to have been that entrepreneurship was universally
latent. In fact, rules of exclusion were devised at this stage.
Recruitment was supposed to be in favour of new entrepreneurs, and
to exclude certain non.priority industries, such as jewellery, printing,
handicrafts. Technical and advisory institutions were set up, but they
were to service the potential entrepreneur, to respond to his
initiative.
Phase 2: welfare and commercialisation
In the Third Plan period, two potentially contradictory patterns
emerged. On the one hand, the welfare themes were stressed, and a
second round of estates was pushed out to smaller and more remote
towns and villages. On the other hand, a series of themes about the
need to organise and run estates according to "commercial criteria"
appeared and was used to justify various decisions. Signs of conflict
between the two kinds of criteria began to be evident.
The decision about the location of the new estates seems to have
been a cabinet-level one, reinforced by a decision to push the specific
decision-making down to low-level local bodies. As department
executives now put it, these decisions were the "victim" of the
decentralisation vogue. "We were then into the era of panchayati raj
and so on. It was becoming an established procedure that projects
should be mooted or planned by the district development councils
(consisting of technical field officers, district collector and local
politicians)."
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The department now claims that "vested interests" were entirely
responsible for these decisions. In the case of one rural estate I
visited, consisting of 19 sheds of which only three are occupied nine
years after completion, and which stands in the middle of acres of
paddy land, the present additional director now claims that he tried
at the time to get the decision reversed, but that the district collector
was, by then, too heavily committed to the local member of the
legislative assembly who had agreed to recommend a piece of
land which a local landlord wanted to dispose of. These sites are all
at small towns or villages which have no common features, such as
being marketing centres or having agro-products with potential
for processing, or any of the characteristics which now form a
standard list in the "growth point' literature.
The commercialisation indicators were several. The state government
was apparently receiving and handing on messages from the
government of India about the need to commercialise the running of
the estates. In 1962, their management was handed over to a
newly.established state corporation. The justification for this was
that the development of small industry "could be better organised
by a corporation than by the government department, where rules
and procedures delay decisions which will affect the rate of
development". In 1966, rent for sheds began to be charged at an
economic, rather than a subsidised, rate, and a hire purchase scheme
for the purchase of the sheds was started. The corporation also began
to operate in the raw materials market, re-selling to small enterprises
on a profit-making basis.
The most interesting decision during the period was one which tried
to combine what by then were beginning to be seen as "welfare" and
"economic rationality" criteria. This again was a decision taken
within the department and concerned an estate which formed part
of a Rural Industries Project. Again, this programme originated with
the planning commission and it. had been justified, even more so
than the general estates programme, as a means of promoting
industrial decentralisation. The projects were financed by the centre,
which stipulated that they should cover a whole district designated as
backward. In 1964, the Kerala department of industries set up a
state-level advisory committee, with the minister as chairman, to
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design such a programme for the district of Alleppey, a coastal
district entirely dominated by coconut and paddy cultivation, the
declining coir industry and fishing. As a preliminary, a department
team undertook a feasibility study, which was supposed to discover
what kind of industry should be encouraged.
The report starts with the general statement that "the development
of small-scale industry has so far been in or near to cities . . . so in
the Third Plan, emphasis has been laid on encouraging the further
growth of industries in rural areas and in small townsas well as less
developed areas". It goes on to recommend that "the programme of
industries to be developed in a selected area should be based on a
careful survey of the needs, resources and possibilities of the
area . . . in drawing up the programme, the people of the
area . . . should be fully involved and their suggestions taken into
account . . . There should be stress on the training of artisans." The
report went on to recommend two kinds of industry, first those
based on local materials, such as units producing desiccated coconut,
activated charcoal, starch from tapioca, strawboard and polished
glass using beach sand. The second group was described as need-based
or non-resource based, such as tin-can fabrication, bailing hoops for
coir yarn, umbrellas and units making simple chemicals. "A small
unit can easily survive only by supplying the colleges and schools of
our own state".
What actually emerged as the main component of the Rural
Industries Project was a chemical manufacturing estate consisting of
units making relatively sophisticated products, mainly inputs for the
pharmaceuticals industry, and placed on the very edge of Alleppey
district, so that it was only technically in an underdeveloped district,
but in practice entirely geared to the urban complex of Cochin port.
The now second additional director of industries claims that
decisions about this estate were taken entirely at the directorate and
project level. The starting point was the decision to concentrate on
the chemical industry, his own technical specialisation. An important
factor was the willingness of an established local businessman, then
operating in Bombay, to come back to Kerala to start a
pharmaceutical plant with government support. The project
ASSISTANCE TO SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES IN KERALA 63
apparently tried to recruit from the district headquarters of Alleppey
itself, but since the site was 30 miles distant on the edge of the
district, this "came to nothing". Furthermore, the investigating team
"wanted to consult the local people and panchayats, but concluded
this was useless because their outlook was restricted and they had no
technical expertise". The main reason for placing the estate so close
to Cochin, apart from the availability of skilled labour and the port
facilities, was the nearness of a government of India fertilizers and
chemicals plant, which could supply inputs.
This marked the beginning of the emergence of a departmental
consensus that the urban-ness of an estate's location is vital. There
was a strong reaction to the earlier investment pattern and a swing
towards what has come to be defended as economic rationality. lt is
further evidenced by decisions which were taken about the only new
estate to be constructed since the Third Plan period, and by the
attitude now taken to the rural estates. These estates were formally
acknowledged to be failures after the department stayed any further
building of sheds in 1967, pending the report of an internal
committee on why some estates were not working. By now, it was
becoming apparent that there were major problems which could
hardly be ignored. In many estates, sheds were standing empty long
after they were completed, and no entrepreneurs were forthcoming.
In other cases, sheds were allotted but not occupied, or else units
appeared and then died very quickly; The 1967 report concluded
that, except for six out of the 18 estates (and all these in the larger
town sites) all were in an unsatisfactory condition, and that the main
reason was that "factors favourable to the functioning of industry
were not taken into account in deciding on the location. Also, while
the idea of spreading industries to rural areas may look very good as
a laudable objective, in actual practice, such small units located in
rural areas have to survive very heavy economic odds and in the
process, may not survive at all".
The most recently-founded industrial estate is located on the edge of
the Cochin-Ernakulam industrial complex, in the centre of what
industrial concentration there is in Kerala. It also differs from earlier
estates in not providing standard sheds, but only plots for the units
and credit for them to construct their own buildings. The units now
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appearing on this site are, typically, relatively sophisticated
enterprises owned by men from high-status backgrounds, in caste
and occupational terms, and often having themselves had
considerable industrial experience in large firms outside Kerala. Many
of these men have been specifically invited to come back to Kerala to
start units in the estate. As such, they represent the kind of potential
source of entrepreneurship which decision-makers have come to
recognise as the most responsive and the most worthwhile, and on
whom resources are likely to be increasingly concentrated.
Research Findings: 2
The second part of the research consisted of a survey of existing
small-scale industries, both inside and outside states, which was
intended to provide a picture of the social and economic
characteristics of these units. Specifically, it indicates some points
about the selective effect of the states programme on the recruitment
of small entrepreneurs, and also how the operation of routine
allocation decisions has affected the distribution of benefits amongst
the whole population of units.
My survey consisted of 70 enterprises, drawn from two city estates
and two medium town estates (all, therefore, officially successful),
and from two non-estate areas, one being the central area of
Ernakulam city, and the other being a small town of 5,000 at a
distance of 50 miles from Ernakulam. The 70 units in the sample
were a heterogeneous collection. They fall into eight industry
categories, the two largest being rubber products and metal goods,
followed by light engineering, chemicals, wood products, plastics, a
group made up of food products, garments and leather, and another
miscellaneous or residual-group, including glass, ceramics, candles
and cardboard boxes. All these groups were represented in both
estate and non-estate samples, and only rubber was markedly
over-represented in the former group, and this because one of the
estates happened to be a rubber-specialised one.
The most striking characteristic of the sample was its range in the
size and sophistication of the units. I classified them into three
groups, based on the organisation-technology stereotypes of
"artisan-simple", "workshop" and "factory". In the first category I
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placed all the units using only hand-tools or in which, if power was
used, it was still the worker who applied the power-driven
mechanism to the work-in-progress, as with an electric sewing
machine or saw. In this kind of unit, typically there is no division of
labour, so that expansion lies along the path of replication, of
installing another man with his tools or machine. The factory is the
type at the other end of the sophistication spectrum. The machinery
is more complex and usually involves the co-operation of several
workers. There is division of labour, and the managerial function
begins to be marked off as an office-job, rather than as a
production-supervisory one. There is also a separating out of
skill-levels, the main machine workers working at a iow skill-level as
adjuncts to the machine, and production is regular and routinised,
with the pace set basically by the machine.
The workshop is an intermediate category. It involves some division
of labour and more complex machinery than the artisan unit, but the
production is generally non-routinised. Often there is a service
element, since repairs as well as manufacturing are carried out. Many
of the light engineering units fell into this category, and also units
manufacturing by a batch or recipe method, such as some of those
making paint, ink or tiles.
The three types of unit show quite markedly different
characteristics, both in terms of the social background and career
experience of the entrepeneurs, and in terms of the operational
features of the enterprise. There were no high caste Hindus amongst
the artisan-simple entrepreneurs, but 35 per cent of the workshop
group fell into this category, and 37 per cent in the factory group. Of
this latter group, 18 per cent were Brahmins, a much higher
representation than. their percentage in the population. Only one of
the entrepreneurs from the artisan-simple group was a graduate, but
43 per cent of the workshop group and 62 per cent of the factory
group were. It is also striking that the overwhelming majority of the
factory entrepreneurs have one or both of two characteristics; either
they come from large land-owning families (41 per cent) or they have
had careers in large industry outside the state (34 per cent) and come
from entrepreneurial, professional or civil service backgrounds. A
further 19 per cent of the group had both these characteristics but
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only six per cent had neither. A relatively high proportion of the
workshop group (70 per cent) had one of these characteristics, but
the land-owners constituted a smaller percentage (24 per cent) and
the industrial career men a correspondingly high percentage.
As far as the enterprises were concerned, there were clear differences
in the supply and marketing catchment areas of the three groups.
Only two out of 14 of the artisan group were buying more than 10
per cent of their materials outside the state, and most were buying all
in the local town. Nine out of 21 of the workshop group were buying
more than 50 per cent outside the state, as were 18 out of 35 of the
factory group. As for marketing area, 69 per cent of the artisan
group were selling more than 75 per cent of their output in the same
town and none was selling outside the state; of the workshop group,
19 per cent were selling more than 50 per cent of their output
outside the state, whilst for the factory group this percentage was 53.
The artisan unit, therefore, is typically very locally-oriented and its
owner is from a low-status social group and usually of artisan or
petty trade background, whilst the factory unit is typically operating
within extensive supply and marketing networks, and is typically
owned by a cosmopolitan-type entrepreneur who comes either from
outside the estate, has had industrial career experience outside the
state, or who comes from a landed background, whilst the workshop
entrepreneurs and units share these characteristics, but to a lesser
extent.
Whilst all these types of units are found operating successfully in
both urban and small town non-estate settings, the estates in both
locations are clearly drawing predominantly on the factory category.
This category is markedly over-represented in the estate group as
compared with the non-estate group, accounting for 76 per cent of
the units, as against only 25 per cent in the non-estate group. The
workshop group is under-represented (24 per cent as against 29 per
cent) and the artisan-simple group highly under-represented (two per
cent as against 46 per cent).
Insofar, therefore, as the successful estate units display the features
of high-prestige entrepreneurial recruitment, relative technical
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sophistication and extended trading networks, they do so because
they are representative of a general conjunction of these
characteristics in the population of small enterprises, and flot
specifically because of their location in estates. But it seems to be
true that the existence of the estates has produced an increase in the
numbers of this kind of unit functioning in Kerala, since many of
these entrepreneurs said they had come back to Kerala and started
units only because they had heard of the estates, or been specifically
invited into them. Because there are proportionately more factory
units in the estates it is also true that there are proportionately more
large units inside the estates than outside them since size is related to
technology level. The average employment of estate units is 29
against 21 for non-estate units and, taking the current replacement
value of fixed capital plus one month's working capital, and taking
the dividing-line at Rs 100,000, the distribution of sample units is as
follows:
ESTATE NON-ESTATE
SMALLTOWN URBAN SMALLTOWN
It is clear from these indicators that the estates are not recruiting
entrepreneurs from amongst low-status social groups. They are
providing an arena for the growth of a new entrepreneurial class,
owing typically relatively large and sophisticated units, and drawn
from landed interests and professional groups, which is also
developing outside the estates.
There remains the question of why the unsuccessful rural estates did
not show a similar pattern. The first question is, why have the larger
factory and workshop units which have survived in the successful
estates not been attracted to the more remote areas?
The obvious answer to this, and the conclusion reached by
administrators, is that they are deterred by the economic costs
involved. But, in practice, this is difficult to substantiate. In the first
URBAN
LARGE 67%(12) 70%(16) 20%(4) 44%(4)
SMALL 33%(6) 30%(7) 80% (16) 56%(5)
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place, as mentioned above, most of the units in the factory category
buy a large proportion of their materials outside the state. A
substantial proportion of these are heavy materials, particularly
metal, for which virtually all the units use road transport. When these
materials are coming from Madras, Bombay or Calcutta, what
matters in cost terms, is not whether the site is urban or not, but
how near it is to the state border. (Kerala has a road network of much
higher standard than most states). In any case, any extra transport
cost would almost always be outweighed by other savings. For
example, there is a difference of 14 per cent between the average
skilled wage rates paid in city and small-town units. And yet, most
entrepreneurs in the medium-town and urban estates were convinced
that there would be cost factors involved, though they could not
substantiate this. They also suggest that there are less quantifiable
costs involved, such as that rural labour is "less committed". But in
the large units which were operating in the small town in my sample,
if this was true it was offset by the ability to hire a larger proportion
of the labour force on a casual basis, an arrangement which is less
possible in the city because labour is more organised. It is also not a
question of basic infrastructure, since this is provided in rural estates.
It seems that the preferences of these units for medium town or city
estates are based on a range of non-purely-economic factors, such as
the availability of services such as good eating facilities, higher-level
consumption-good markets and, perhaps most of all, being able to
visit associates and friends and government officials without having
to travel, and being able to tap various unpredictable information
networks, in particular news about the black market availability of
raw materials, the importance of which will be referred to again
below. The kinds of men who start factory-type units are usually
urban-biased for a range of not-purely-economic reasons. The landed
entrepreneur, on the other hand, is biased in favour of the
medium-sized market town which is the traditional centre of his
social and economic life or, if he operates from a rural area, he is
likely to do so from his own estate or compound, since he will often
also be performing a land-management function.
Of course it would be ridiculous to argue that the "pure cost"
aspects of location are irrelevant to the functioning of industrial
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enterprises, and even to small-scale units such as these. There are
many operational factors which may be related to
space-as-transport-cost, in the specific sense of distance from urban
centres. Much will depend on the particular sources of raw materials,
kinds of transport used, location of rail-heads, availability of and
demand for skilled labour, degree of urban-rural variation in
wage-rates, location and dispersion of markets, and all the other
factors considered relevant in classical location theory. All that is
being claimed here is that, in this particular case, these factors arc
not sufficient, nor even predominantly influential in determining the
urban-location preference of certain groups of entrepreneurs. The
theme about the economic rationality of urban locations masks the
fact that decision-makers have learned to structure access by
responding to the non-purely-economically determined preferences
of certain categories of clients. In doing so, they may be furthering
the incentive and efficiency aspects of the programme and
undermining its welfare potential. Also they are effectively accepting
that administratively-controlled distribution, far from countering the
effects of market inequalities, may only end up responding to, and
even reinforcing, the inequalities in the stocks of assets already
possessed by its potential clients and outside its sphere of
intervention.
The competitive disadvantage of the client who lacks resources of
contacts and wealth is obvious again and again in the distribution
process. To take the case of credit, my sample shows that the larger
and the more sophisticated the unit, the greater its chance of getting
credit and getting it at a favourable rate. Quite apart from the fact
that these entrepreneurs can often call on family wealth derived from
land or on personal savings accumulated over a career of high-salaried
employment, they also have better access to credit institutions. The
best rate is to be obtained from the special institution set up for the
purpose, the Kerala Financial Corporation. But this was universally
reported (a) to be only interested in providing large loans, and
(b) to demand an unofficial "commission" of 10 to 15 per cent,
much higher than the banks. Furthermore, it has only two offices in
Kerala, so that it is a major effort to use it, and it is also reported to
be much slower in processing applications. The smaller the unit, the
more likely it is to go to a bank rather than the KFC, or to a dealer
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rather than to a bank, each of these options involving progressively
higher interest rates.
Where there are several access points to a distributed service, there is
again scope for disproportionate advantage on the part of the
best-endowed competitors. For example, again in the case of steel,
the optimal method for a small unit is to acquire a licence from the
controller of imports and exports to import the material directly.
One small factory in Kerala, owned by a Maharashtrian, which was
importing tin-plate directly from Swansea was paying only 60 per
cent (landed cost) of the official price for comparable indigenous
steel. Needless to say, licences to import are not resources which
small units are likely to obtain. In some cases, where clients can
qualify at several equally advantageous access points, they again have
the advantage. For example, when the department of industries'
supply of cement ran out because of local strikes, a unit making tiles,
one of whose partners was an architect, managed to acquire a supply
through the public works department 's allocation, a stock which was
intended only for public projects. To acquire a contract to supply a
government department with manufactured goods, such as
equipment to the electricity board, is another way of helping to
ensure access to scarce materials. The ability to manipulate several
access points gives a client a general flexibility of manoeuvre and
therefore a greater chance of overcoming scarcities.
Finally, in the case where a good is only partially controlled by
administrative allocation, it may be possible for some consumers to
capitalise on the very fact that there is a co-existing market
distribution by acting as a recipient in one sphere and as a distributor
or seller in the other. This is particularly true of scarce materials.
Despite the fact that virtually the whole distribution of steel is
supposed to be by public allocation at fixed prices, the major source
of supply for small industries is the ordinary market which is in fact
the black market, since it consists entirely of steel which has leaked
from official channels through the re-sale of quotas, a process largely
controlled by middle-men who are small-time dealers. This re-selling
is often by bogus or part-time units which have no real intention to
manufacture, but it may involve full-time manufacturers who
actually find this the most profitable course. The non-Keralite and
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cosmopolitan entrepreneurs are conspicuously more successful at this
kind of operation. A unit making barbed wire and run by a Punjabi,
for example, was selling off its total allocation of steel wire which it
received directly from Hindustan Steel in Calcutta (units can indent
directly with the steel procurers) at a profit of 30 per cent in the
black market in Kerala. The wire they used for manufacturing was
bought on the black market in Calcutta at only about 10 per cent
above the official price, so that their net profit, even before
manufacture, was a good 10 per cent allowing for transport costs. In
this case, the unit benefited from being able to operate in two
separated black markets, as well as in the fixed price distribution,
and this of course was a function mostly of "contacts", that most
useful of resources.
Of course, the whole range of unequally possessed assets external to
the public distribution process can affect not only the competition
for access, but also the use made of the benefits received. The most
important of these is education and career experience, possessed by
the category of entrepreneurs here labelled as cosmopolitans. These
are the keys to the working assets of know-how, information,
influence, contacts, which in many ways are more important than
wealth, though the two are associated. This is particularly the case in a
peripheral state such as Kerala where in the industrial sector, so
much depends on the ability to gain access to technology,
collaboration, materials and markets, which are often most available
at the extra-state level. Success in manufacturing depends largely, not
on the ability to take risks, but on the ability either to avoid them or
to insure against them by creating a wide network of options and a
stock of contingency resources, whether these are preferences in
materials markets of a straight or black-market nature, contacts with
the police which will help in dealing with strikes (or alternatively,
with the unions as a preventive device; many manufacturers give
donations to all the relevant unions), or influence with the
electricity board for avoiding crucial local power interruptions or
getting prompt repairs to equipment.
These advantages work in favour of the larger and higherstatus
entrepreneurs, and against the less wealthy, lower class and low caste
ones. It is a problem which has much to do with the way routine
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public allocations work, and the inability of these processes to
overcome other kinds of inequalities amongst clients. It is a problem
which the juggling of estate locations can do little to remedy, since
such units at present have a high turnover rate wherever located,
because of their exposure to a range of risk factors they cannot
insure against. The small and particularly the artisan-simple units in
my sample were clearly only the tip of an iceberg of many such units
which are constantly appearing and disappearing. For example,
although my urban non-estate sample-frame was supposed to consist
oniy of units known to be functioning, I had to replace eight out of
the 20 selected, and all small units. These are basically subsistence
units. In half of my sample group of artisan units, the income
accruing to the proprietor did not exceed the wage he was paying his
senior worker, and, in the others the difference was marginal. Such
units are very vulnerable to crises, and such a situation may have to
be met by disinvestment. Such units would require very specific
kinds of support, most obviously non-security based loans for
working capital or guaranteed outlets for products, which they are
not at the moment receiving.
Overall Distributional Implications of the Programme
The small industry programme, then, is not generally dispersing small
enterprises to rural areas, nor is it recruiting successful entrepreneurs
from low-status backgrounds. Here, there are some points to be made
about the differences in distributional effect as between urban (city)
and medium town estates. The latter are clearly recruiting
entrepreneurs quite heavily from amongst the landed families and
plantation owners. Sixteen per cent of these entrepreneurs were
minor land-holders (between three and 1 5 acres, which is enough to
yield a substantial income) as against 11 per cent in the urban estate
group, but no less than 63 per cent were major land-holders, as
against.28 per cent in the urban group. Some of the estates, most
rubber, tea or cardamom, are in the range of 1,000 to 1,5000 acres
and some of these families have already expanded into trade and
agro-processing. One family partnership in a rubber goods unit, for
example, already controls 45 cashew factories, a car-repairing unit,
two grape estates, a brewery, a rubber plantation and two
contracting businesses, as well as substantial holdings of paddy and
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coconut land. Several of these units are run by non-managing
partnerships, the equivalent of absentee landlords in agriculture.
The urban estates, on the other hand, are recruiting much more
heavily from amongst the cosmopolitan group (66 per cent of
entrepreneurs as against 26 per cent in the medium-town estates).
Three out of 18 in this category in the urban estates were
non-Keralites who had emigrated from the north, whilst the rest were
Keralites who had returned to Kerala in mid-career. Sometimes this
represents a carefully-planned career pattern, and the nature of the
enterprises these men start is most often determined by their own
industrial experience.
Insofar, therefore, as class groupings are being affected by the growth
of small industry in Kerala, it seems that new mobility channels are
being created more significantly at the higher than at the lower levels
of the class structure. There is some mobility on the part of low-caste
Hindus from non-professional and non-landed parental background
into ownership of workshop-type units via the educational process,
as engineering courses have expanded rapidly over the last five years.
This is likely to continue as the market for engineering graduates
becomes over-supplied. But the prominence of plantation interests
amongst successful entrepreneurs represents a reinforcing of the
economic power of an agrarian capitalist class, now experiencing a
narrowing of the opportunity to invest in land, partly because of
increasing pressure on land and partly because of the land reforms,
despite their limited impact. The cosmopolitans, on the other hand,
are drawn almost exclusively from the high-caste groups who might
also be land-owners, but who previously went mostly into the
professions, government service or extra-state managerial jobs, and
who will now become in greater numbers small capitalists rather than
high salaried employees.
In terms of the original claims made for the small industry
programme, the distributional effects have been somewhat narrow
and concentrated, particularly as the department of industries has
had to concentrate on "making estates work". On the part of the
bodies whose job is ostensibly to evaluate these outcomes, one finds
a continuing janus-like ambivaencc. For example, a report produced
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this year by the Kerala Planning Board makes the initial
"efficiency-type" statement that "if the units are to develop as an
integral part of the economy, it is necessary that they should provide
employment at the minimal capital cost and at the same time
generate an economic surplus to pave the way for self-sustained
growth". However, after noting the extent of public investment and
the low rental return, it remarks that "no attempt is made to assess
the rate of return in financial terms, since consideration of financial
profitability is not very relevant." In its conclusion, it states that "in
view of the paucity of relevant data, a cost-benefit analysis is not
attempted at present," but goes on to assert, without evidence, that
"this evaluation study reveals that the programme has by and large
contributed to the growth of new industrial enterprises and to the
dispersal of industries in the remote and comparatively less
developed areas of the state . . . although the quantum of
employment generated was not of much significance, it has opened
up direct and indirect employment opportunities to many, and eased
in a small measure the pressure on land".
In other words, where the quantifiable data is unimpressive, on
efficiency criteria, a variety of unquantifiable, and mostly welfare,
outcomes is appealed to. This kind of report is unhelpful in terms of
policy-implications. What it does do is to provide justification for
any decision which might be taken, since the decision-maker is free
to add his own weights to the unquantifiable factors. If it were really
to argue for a primary emphasis on promotional or welfare factors in
defiance of efficiency ones, then it would have to acknowledge the
cost to be met (in terms of heavy subsidies, free credit or whatever).
Or if it were to conclude that the supposed welfare objectives are
mostly unattainable within this kind of programme, then that also
would have to be said. In the absence of either of these approaches
being adopted, those in charge of the programme will no doubt go on
taking the kind of pragmatic decision which continues to pay tribute
to increased equality as an object of policy, but actually, if anything,
in practice works against such an end.
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